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ABSTRACT: 
Much of the research on industry dynamics focuses on the interdependence between the sectorial rates 
of entry and exit. This paper argues that the size of firms and the reaction-adjustment period are 
important conditions missed in this literature. I illustrate the effects of this omission using data from 
the Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2001. Estimates from systems of equations 
models provide evidence of a conical revolving door phenomenon and of partial adjustments in the 
replacement-displacement of large firms.  
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1. Introduction 
Critical issues in Industrial Organization, such as competition, efficiency and innovation, hinge to a 
large extent on the markets’ selection process. It is not surprising, therefore, to find so many papers 
investigating the reasons behind the inflows and outflows of firms. However, the only studies that are 
of interest here are those that analyse the determinants of the rates of entry and exit in manufacturing 
industries  (broadly  defined  by  SIC  codes)  and  address  questions  related  to  the  fringe  of  market 
structure.
1  This  largely  empirical  literature  has  contributed  to  a  better  understanding  of  market 
turnover by presenting a number of stylised facts about entry and exit. At the same time, it has raised 
interesting research questions and economic policy concerns about its mechanics (Geroski, 1995; 
Caves, 1998). This paper focuses on the implications that the interdependence between aggregate 
entry and exit has for the analysis of industry dynamics.  
 
To illustrate the importance of this concern we need only consider a few qualified views about the 
way entry and exit are related. Whereas some leading researchers in the area claim that “industries 
may be more consistently characterised by turnover rates than by net entry rates” (Dunne et al., 1988: 
514), others wonder “[w]hich metaphor, that of displacement, where the new saplings in a forest 
overtake  the  old  trees,  or  of  the  revolving  door,  where  there  is  considerable  exit  but  very  little 
permanent penetration is correct?” (Audretsch, 1995: 156). There are also those who believe that 
“mass-exit naturally follows mass-entry and does not require a deep explanation” (Horvath et al. 
2001: 1024), while others stress that “firm-turnover (...) is not a phenomenon confined to a group of 
small  firms  that  constantly  churn  at  the  margin”  (Baldwin  and  Gorecki,  1991:  321).  Our  results 
somehow reconcile these conflicting viewpoints. They indicate that at the industry level entry and exit 
are related in a dynamic way that reminds one of a conical revolving door at the bottom of which 
demand  and  technological  conditions  are  partly  responsible  for  the  turbulent  behaviour  of  small 
concerns and at the top of which a displacement-replacement of large firms occurs.  
                                                                        
1  In  other  words,  we  restrict  attention  to  the  dynamics  of  industries  in  the  short  term  and  do  not  consider 
questions related to their life cycle or long-term evolution.  
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There are indeed studies that analyse entry and exit independently see Geroski and Schwalbach 
(1991) and Siegfried and Evans (1994). However, the high correlation between the rates of entry and 
exit found in different countries and periods suggests that these are not isolated phenomena (Cable 
and Schwalbach, 1991). Modelling the empirical behaviour of these variables therefore requires some 
form of interrelation in the econometric specifications. Following an influential paper by Shapiro and 
Khemani (1987) this is usually done in two ways. One way is via the error terms, maintaining a 
certain  symmetry  in  the  vector  of  explanatory  variables  (i.e.  estimating  a  system  of  seemingly 
unrelated regressions, SUR). The other way is via the explanatory variables, including entry and exit 
(i.e.  estimating  a  simultaneous  equations  model,  SEM).  These  two  approaches  have  become  a 
benchmark and are the starting point for this study. New evidence on the symmetry and simultaneity 
hypotheses is provided using entry and exit data from the Spanish Central Register of Firms (DIRCE, 
a data base from the National Statistical Institute) between 1994 and 2001. I also examine model 
selection  procedures  to  discriminate  between  these  two  hypotheses  in  the  Spanish manufacturing 
industries see Segarra (2002) for a thorough analysis of this data set. These include results from 
goodness-of-fit measures for seemingly unrelated and IV regressions (Buse 1979; Pesaran and Smith, 
1994),  as  wells  as  t-tests  on  the  nested  structure  of  the  proposed  econometric  specifications. 
Ultimately, this paper discusses why it is important to consider the size of the firms and the dynamic 
nature of agents’ decisions in this setting.  
 
Firm size has been shown to be important for the analysis of industry dynamics.
2 However, to my 
knowledge its role in the symmetry and simultaneity frameworks has not been addressed. In this paper 
I distinguish between intervals of size (defined by the DIRCE) when estimating the system of entry 
and exit equations and discuss moment conditions for consistently doing this when aggregate panel 
data are used (see the appendix for details). One reason for this apparent gap in the literature may be 
                                                                        
2 See e.g. Lieberman (1990), Baldwin and Gorecki (1991), Fariñas et al. (1992), Mata and Machado (1996) and 
Fariñas and Moreno (2000).  
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that researchers have mostly focused on testing Gibrat’s Law. However, it does not seem plausible to 
assume that patterns of entry and exit across big firms and small and medium-sized concerns are 
homogenous.  Small  newcomers,  for  example,  are  likely  to  face  liquidity  constraints  that  may 
precipitate exit and/or delay entry, while large incumbents have generally easier access to external 
and internal funds and are therefore probably less affected by these constraints (Evans and Jovanovic 
1989,  Audretsch  and  Elston,  2002).  Other  studies  that  have  explored  this  idea  along  the  lines 
discussed in this paper are Acs and Audrestch (1989a, 1989b), Mata (1991) and Wagner (1994). 
However, in their analyses they focus on entry using cross-section and pooled data. 
 
This  paper's  second  contribution  stems  from  the  introduction  of  a  simple  timing  structure  in  the 
decisions of entry and exit (Geroski et al., 1987; Geroski, 1991). I will argue that the relation between 
them is broadly guided by the following game (Jovanovic, 1982; Frank, 1988): in stage 1 Nature plays 
and causes the entries or exits, and in stage 2 agents observe the outcome and decide. A number of 
theoretical models discuss similar tenets (Dixit and Shapiro, 1986; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Pakes et 
al., 2003), and related empirical evidence based on descriptive statistics (e.g. Dunne et al., 1988), 
hazard  functions  (e.g.  Audrestch  and  Mahmood,  1995)  and  time  series models (e.g. Geroski and 
Mazzucato, 2001) also exists. Because of the panel structure of the data, in this paper I consider the 
dynamics of entry and exit using an error-components system of equations and including the lag of 
entry as a covariate in the exit equation, and vice versa.
3 As Geroski and Mata (2001: 999) pointed 
out, “[n]ot only can important unobservables be controlled for using (...) a panel, but the time series 
dimension of such data enables one to say something about market dynamics”. Other studies that 
resort to an analogous econometric specification are those of Johnson and Parker (1994), Carree and 
Thurik (1996) and Lay (2003), although none exploits the error-components structure of the model as 
                                                                        
3 Firstly, the use of panel data allows me to control for unobservable sectorial effects (see e.g. Dunne and Roberts 
1991 and Segarra et al. 2002). This aspect is surprisingly absent in many previous studies, such as those of 
Sleuwagen  and  Dehadschutter  (1991)  and  Fotopoulos  and  Spence  (1998).  Secondly,  although  some  studies 
include endogenous variables (e.g., Sleuwagen and Dehadschutter, 1991 and Kleijweg and Lever, 1996) or lags 
of the dependent variable (e.g., Shapiro and Khemani, 1987; Austin and Rosembaum, 1990; Evans and Sigfried,  
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I do (see the appendix for details). Moreover, Johnson and Parker (1994) and Carree and Thurik 
(1996) focus on retailing and Lay (2003) examines a developing country. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the symmetry and simultaneity 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the introduction of dynamics in this analytical framework. Sections 2 
and 3 provide the economic foundations for the econometric specifications presented in section 4. 
Section  5  maintains  that  it  is  necessary  to discriminate between size intervals in order to obtain 
appropriate  inferences.  Section  6  discusses  the  main  results  of  model  estimation  and  evaluation. 
Section 7 is the conclusion.  
 
2. The relation between aggregate entry and exit 
Many studies on industry dynamics focus on one of the flows of market turnover: either entry or exit. 
Following a simple maximisation rule, new firms enter the markets when the expected benefits of this 
decision are positive, whereas incumbents abandon their activity if the expected benefits are negative. 
Illustrative examples of this approach can be found in the collection of papers edited by Geroski and 
Schwalbach (1991). What is interesting to note here is that these studies use an econometric model 
which  implicitly  assumes  that  the  data  generation  processes  of  the  entry  and  exit  variables  are 
independent.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
This  assumption  implies,  for  example, that in a typical economy one would expect to observe a 
negative relationship between entry and exit. This is because entries are likely to be more intense in 
the upswings of the business cycle (i.e. they are procyclical), and exits are likely to be more intense in 
the downswings (i.e. they are anticyclical). The empirical evidence, however, does not support this 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1992; and Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998) on the right hand side of the model, their goal is not to analyse short-
term dynamics but to solve identification, endogeneity and/or data availability problems.   
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tenet. On the contrary, the rates of entry and exit in different countries and periods tend to behave 
closely (Cable and Schwalbach, 1991). In our sample, for example, the correlation between the annual 
rates of entry and exit in the Spanish manufacturing industry is 0.63. Also, as the detail of Table 1 
shows, in most of the Spanish manufacturing sectors the correlations over the period of analysis 
defining our data set are effectively positive see also Segarra et al. (2002).  
 
Another implication derived from the independence assumption is that demand and technological 
factors  affecting  entry  should  be  different  from  those  affecting exit. Accordingly, the correlation 
between the sectorial rates of entry and exit is expected to be weak. Once again, this tenet is at odds 
with the empirical evidence. One of the stylised facts on which there is general agreement between 
researchers is the high correlation between entry and exit rates by industry (Geroski, 1995; Caves, 
1998). As an illustration, the average correlation between these rates in the Spanish manufacturing 
sectors in the period between 1994 and 2001 is 0.51  also see Segarra (2002). 
 
These  contradictions suggest that the independence hypothesis is too restrictive and may involve 
serious  errors  of  specification.  Therefore,  we  must  abandon  it  and  move  a  step  forward  in  the 
analytical foundations sustaining the empirical tests. The above-mentioned evidence fits nicely into 
two  frameworks:  one  based  on  symmetry  and  one  based  on  simultaneity  (Shapiro  and Khemani, 
1987). Next I shall briefly analyse each of these frameworks and later I shall review the empirical 
evidence. 
 
2.1 Symmetry  
One possible explanation for these statistical regularities around the rates of entry and exit is that their 
determinants are actually the same. This would imply perfect symmetry in the vector of explanatory 
variables.  In  practice,  however,  this  “strong”  version  of  the  symmetry  hypothesis  is  hardly  ever 
considered (one exception is Anagnostaki and Louri, 1995). Rather, it is common to employ a “weak”  
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version in which only some of the regressors are the same and allow for correlation between the error 
terms of the entry and exit equations. These regressors are “common” (structural or behavioural) 
barriers in the sense that they affect both entry and exit. Well-known examples of these barriers are 
assets that, because of their specificity and durability, become sunk costs (Caves and Porter, 1976, 
1977). On the one hand, investing in such assets is a requirement for entry and, if the potential entrant 
effectively becomes an incumbent, the investment eventually becomes a disincentive to exit. On the 
other  hand,  these  barriers  to  exit  can  also  raise  barriers  to  entry  because  they  can  alter  the 
expectations of the potential entrants (Dixit, 1980): directly, e.g. increasing the discount factor of the 
expected  benefits;  and/or  indirectly,  e.g.  as  a  form  of  signalling  that  incumbents  will  behave 
aggressively against the entrants.  
 
2.2 Simultaneity 
An alternative (or perhaps complementary) explanation is that entry and exit are interrelated in a 
Schumpeterian setting of “creative destruction”. The entry of new (efficient) firms in a market causes 
the exit of the (less efficient) producers and there is consequently a displacement effect. However, 
existing firms leave behind a “vacuum” of resources and sets of unsatisfied customers that are an 
appealing carrot for potential entrants. This may change the subjective probability of success for the 
potential entrants to the extent that they may indeed decide to enter and replace those who have left. 
The outcome of these opposite effects is known in the literature as the “revolving door” phenomenon 
(Audrestch, 1995) or the “negative feedback model” (Geroski and Mazzucato, 2001).  
 
But is what we observe really creative destruction or is it simply trial and error? Some industries may 
have higher or lower rates than others just because of their idiosyncratic characteristics: regulation, 
technology, etc. If that is the case, the relation between entry and exit is mostly due to fluctuations in 
demand, as in the “market size model” of Geroski and Mazzucato (2001). Changes in the size of the 
markets are ultimately responsible for the success or failure of many (small) firms and for movements  
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on the fringes of industries (Lucas 1978). Therefore, industry turbulence is not necessarily due to 
displacement-vacuum  effects:  perhaps  it  is  only  due  to  “natural  churning”.  What  seems  beyond 
question in any case is that uncontrolled sectorial heterogeneity may lead to spurious conclusions 
(Dunne et al., 1988; Dunne and Roberts, 1991).  
 
2.3 Empirical evidence  
The hypothesis of symmetry is usually tested by using SUR specifications. Statistically significant 
coefficients  for  the  barriers  to  exit  (entry)  included  in  the  entry  (exit)  equation  would  support 
accepting this hypothesis. Shapiro and Khemani (1987), for example, present supportive evidence 
based  on  Canadian  data.  “Symmetry  [also]  appears  to  be  demonstrated  and  extended  beyond 
traditional barriers” in Greece (Anagnostaki and Louri, 1995; Fotopoulos and Spence 1998: 261). In 
Spain and Taiwan, Segarra et al. (2002) and Lay (2003) respectively present mixed evidence that, 
nevertheless, seems to be at least partially supportive. Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992), on the other 
hand,  reject  the  symmetry  hypothesis  in  the  American  manufacturing  industries  see,  however, 
Dunne and Roberts (1991). Similarly, Carree and Thurik (1996) find little evidence of symmetry in 
their vector of explanatory variables. 
 
As  for  the  simultaneous  hypothesis,  it  is  common  to  use  SEM  specifications.  The  displacement-
replacement effects would be supported by statistically significant coefficients of the entry and exit 
variables on the right hand side of the exit and entry equations, respectively. Otherwise, the natural-
churning  view  would  be  accepted.  Shapiro  and  Khemani  (1987),  for  example,  find  evidence  of 
displacement in Canada and, albeit in an indirect way, so do Horvath et al. (2001) in the US brewing, 
automobile and tyre industries. Segarra (2002) and Segarra et al. (2002) in Spain, Sleuwaegen and 
Dehandschutter (1991) in Belgium, and Lay (2003) in Taiwan appear to support the existence of 
displacement-vacuum effects. This also seems to be the case in American and Dutch new business 
starts (Evans and Siegfried 1992, Kleijweg and Lever 1996) and Dutch retailing (Carree and Thurik,  
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1996). However, Austin and Rosenbaum (1990) and Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) in the USA and 
Fotopoulos and Spence (1998) in Greece reject simultaneity because they argue that most of the 
changes in the identity of the incumbent firms occur in the short term and among a fringe of small 
firms. Consequently, these authors raise doubts about the causality and interrelation between entry 
and exit see, however, Carree and Thurik (1996). From their point of view, entry and exit are parts 
of  the  market’s  selection  mechanism  and  are  therefore  subject  to  similar  determinants,  the  most 
important of which are those related to the structural characteristics of the industries.  
 
To sum up we can conclude that the empirical evidence on the symmetry and simultaneity hypotheses 
is not totally conclusive. There are doubts about the displacement-vacuum versus natural-churning 
viewpoints but there is a broad agreement amongst researchers that omitting interdependence entails 
an error of specification. The critical question then is how to model the relation between entry and 
exit properly. In the following sections an attempt to provide such a model is made by analysing two 
missed aspects of the relation: the adjustment period required by the potential entrants (exits) to react 
to the exits (entries) and the assumption that the patterns of behaviour are homogenous for all sizes of 
firms.
4  
 
3. Dynamics 
Cross-section  studies  may  have  obtained  biased  estimates  because  they  neither  control  for  the 
idiosyncratic unobservable effects nor take into account the evolution of the variables over time. As 
for those using panel data, their static specifications are appropriate as long as the reactions to the 
entry and exit of other firms (i.e. the exit and entry, respectively) occur in the same period. Following 
e.g. Geroski (1991), I will argue that this may not be the case, but I will present my arguments in a 
simple, intuitive way. A complete game-theoretical framework is beyond the scope of this paper and 
                                                                        
4 There are, needless to say, other issues worth considering: e.g. those related to the territory (Segarra et al., 
2002),  to  the  types  of  entrants  (Dunne  et  al.,  1988;  Evans  and  Siegfried,  1992),  to  the  definition  of  the 
explanatory  variables  (Acs  and  Audretsch,  1989a,  1989b),  and  to  the  level  of  aggregation  (Cable  and 
Schwalbach, 1991).  
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is left for future research. It is also important to bear in mind that I will restrict my attention to short-
term dynamics. 
 
These caveats aside, let us contemplate the possibility that entries induce exits and vice-versa. The 
point,  however,  is  that  this  cannot  happen  instantaneously.  Agents  do  need  some  time  to  detect 
changes in the environment and implement their decisions. Therefore, we are clearly dealing with a 
dynamic game (Horvath et al., 2001; Pakes et al., 2003). As an illustration, let us consider a sector hit 
by an unexpected demand shock that causes a high number of exits in the market (notice that this may 
occur during a certain period, as in the “contagion model” of Geroski and Mazzucato, 2001). This 
sector then becomes attractive to potential entrants. However, they may need to build up facilities, 
hire workers, etc., and all these actions take some time (Geroski et al., 1987). In terms of the extensive 
form of the game, the decision of whether to enter will materialise once the agents have incorporated 
the information about the shock into their functions of benefits. That is, in stage 1 Nature plays and 
causes the exits and in stage 2 agents observe the outcome and decide (Frank, 1988; Ericson and 
Pakes, 1995). Similarly, consider a sector in which a change in the available technology (for example, 
the Internet) facilitates the entry of new competitors. Some incumbents may be displaced, but this will 
only happen after, for example, the competitive pressure affects their balance sheets and they take all 
the actions at hand to avoid the exit. Naturally, the extensive-form game is analogous. 
 
Firms involved in the entry and exit games do not react instantaneously (Jovanovic, 1982; Dixit and 
Shapiro 1986), as is implicitly assumed in the symmetry and simultaneity literature. However, any test 
on this claim faces the problem of choosing the period of reaction and the appropriate econometric 
specification. For simplicity, and given the discrete time nature of my yearly data, I will assume that 
the reactions to the entry and exit of firms can be observed either in the same year or in the following 
year.  Specifically,  I  will  allow  for  a  temporal  adjustment  in  the  displacement-vacuum  effects  by  
10 
 
including  among  the  covariates  the  lag  of  entry  (exit)  in  the  exit  (entry)  equation.
5  As  for  the 
econometric specification, it is well known that duration and time-series models are good candidates 
when one is concerned with the survival of firms and the long-term evolution of a particular industry 
(Geroski and Mata, 2001). The symmetry-simultaneity framework instead requires the use of systems 
of equations for panel data. I believe that this approach has not previously been exploited as it is in 
this paper.  
 
4. Econometric specifications 
The econometric specifications presented below stem directly from the symmetry and simultaneity 
hypotheses  discussed  in  Section  2.  Models  1  (symmetry)  and  2  (simultaneity)  are  intended  to 
represent typical specifications used in this literature. The difference between these models is that 
Model 2 contains endogenous explanatory variables. With this design I can analyse whether symmetry 
and simultaneity are rival or complementary explanations for the relationship between entry and exit. 
I  also  introduce  dynamic  structures in line with the discussion of Section 3. First, in Model 3 I 
substitute the endogenous explanatory variables for their corresponding lags. Later I include both the 
endogenous explanatory variables and their lags, i.e. Model 4 is a combination of Models 2 and 3. In 
this way I expect to differentiate between the fraction of the displacement-replacement that occurs 
simultaneously and the fraction that occurs after the temporal adjustment. In all models the dependent 
variables are the natural logs of the gross rates of entry (LGREit) and exit (LGRXit), calculated after 
adding 1 to the number of entries and exits in each sector and period to avoid the indeterminacy 
caused by zero entry and exit (Khemani and Shapiro 1986). 
 
Following  Geroski  et  al.  (1990),  the  explanatory  variables  include  structural  barriers  (BARENTit, 
BAREXIit and BARCOMit stand for entry, exit and common barriers, respectively) and strategic actions 
                                                                        
5 This is also the approach used by Carree and Thurik (1996) and Lay (2003), whereas Johnson and Parker 
(1994) determine empirically the optimal lag length using a vector autoregression model. Another possibility is to 
introduce dynamics through the barriers of entry and exit (see e.g. Wagner, 1994; Kleijweg and Lever, 1996;  
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taken by the incumbents, SAit. Entry barriers include market structure and capital requirements. These 
are  approximated,  respectively,  by  an  index  of  concentration  and  the  average  gross  investment 
accounted in the sector. Exit barriers are reduced to sunk costs, which I proxy with the average 
investment per worker. Common structural barriers include the minimum efficient scale, price cost 
margin (a proxy based on sales) and added-value growth of the industry. The vector of strategic 
actions is made up of indirect measurements of product differentiation and technological intensity. 
Finally, I have also included the evolution of the GDP to control for the business cycle and as a rough 
measure of the expected benefits. The vector CYCLEt is formed by ex-post and ex-ante GDP growth. 
These variables somehow play the role of a time-effect in the error component. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 gives definitions of the variables, the statistical sources (all databases from the National 
Institute of Statistics except one) and the expected signs of the parameters based on conclusions from 
previous studies. For comparative purposes I have also included the results of this study (discussed in 
Section 6). In general, higher demand and higher expected benefits favour entries and discourage 
exits. Market concentration, capital requirements and, to a lesser extent, the actions of rivals are 
among the most important barriers to entry. Sunk costs seem to be the main barrier to exit. Notice, 
however, that the empirical evidence in Table 2 provides inconsistent results and is often at odds with 
the Economic Theory see also Siegfried and Evans (1994) and Carree and Thurik (1996).  
 
Demand and technology conditions, as well as the reactions of the incumbent firms partly explain the 
sectorial differences in business rotation. Still, there is an important residual variability that suggests 
non-observable effects must be taken into account (Dunne et al., 1988; Dunne and Roberts, 1991). 
Table 1 shows, for example, that some sectors have high correlations between the rates of entry and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998). However, these are usually seen as long-term effects (Shapiro and Khemani, 
1987; Austin and Rosembaum, 1990; Evans and Sigfried, 1992).   
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exit. This suggests that substantial intra-sectorial flows may occur. The low correlations in other 
sectors, however, indicate that inter-sectorial flows may be more important. By the same token, in 
some industries entry and exit appear to be practically unrelated. The structure of the non-systematic 
part of Models 1 to 4 aims to control for these miscellaneous patterns in Spanish manufacturing 
industries.  The  error  component  includes  an  individual  effect,  λj,  which  controls  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity and a classical disturbance, εjt, which controls for idiosyncratic shocks.  
 
Bearing in mind these definitions, the following relations between entry and exit were estimated: 
 
Model 1: Symmetry. 
 
ε λ β β β β β β β
β α ε λ β β β β α
jt j t 4 jt 32 jt 31 jt 22 i 21 i 13 jt 12
jt 11 jt j t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt
GDPP TI PD GI MS GIAV PCM
MES CYCLE SA BARENT BARCOM LGRE
+ + + + + + + + +
+ = + + + + + + =
 
 
' ' GDPA ' TI ' SC ' GI ' GIAV ' PCM '
MES ' ' ' ' CYCLE ' SA ' BAREXI ' BARCOM ' ' LGRX
jt j t 4 jt 32 jt 31 jt 21 i 13 jt 12
jt 11 jt j t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt
ε λ β β β β β β
β α ε λ β β β β α
+ + + + + + + +
+ = + + + + + + =
 
 
Model 2: Simultaneity. 
 
ε λ β β β β β α jt j jt 5 t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt LGRX CYCLE SA BARENT BARCOM LGRE + + + + + + + =  
' ' LGRE ' CYCLE ' SA ' BAREXI ' BARCOM ' ' LGRX jt j jt 5 t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt ε λ β β β β β α + + + + + + + =  
 
Model 3: Dynamics. 
 
ε λ β β β β β α jt j 1 jt 5 t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt LGRX CYCLE SA BARENT BARCOM LGRE + + + + + + + = −   
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' ' LGRE ' CYCLE ' SA ' BAREXI ' BARCOM ' ' LGRX jt j 1 jt 5 t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt ε λ β β β β β α + + + + + + + = −  
 
Model 4: Simultaneity and Dynamics. 
 
ε λ
β β β β β β α
jt j
jt 52 1 jt 51 t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt LGRX LGRX CYCLE SA BARENT BARCOM LGRE
+ +
+ + + + + + = −
 
' '
LGRE ' LGRE ' CYCLE ' SA ' BAREXI ' BARCOM ' ' LGRX
jt j
jt 52 1 jt 51 t 4 jt 3 jt 2 jt 1 jt
ε λ
β β β β β β α
+ +
+ + + + + + = −
 
 
SUR Models 1 and 3 were estimated using a GLS procedure proposed by Avery (1977). SEMs 2 and 
4 were estimated using an Error Components Three-Stage estimator proposed by Baltagi (1981) see 
the appendix for details. An interesting assumption in both SUR and SEM estimations is that the error 
components  of  the  equations  of  entry  and  exit  are  not  independent,  i.e.  ( ) 0 ' ≠ λ λ j j E   and 
( ) 0 ' ≠ ε ε jt jt E . This is very convenient for model selection because it implies that Models 1, 2, 3 and 
4 are nested. Choosing which model is better for making inference from the data therefore becomes 
straightforward: it is just a matter of testing simple parametric restrictions on the β5 coefficients. 
Conditional on the non-independence assumption, model selection may therefore be based on testing 
the null hypothesis that β5 = 0.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
To evaluate to what extent such an assumption holds in our data, Table 3 shows estimates of the 
variances and covariances of the error terms. In Models 1 and 3 these estimates are based on Least 
Squares (LS) residuals and in Models 2 and 4 they are based on Two-Stage LS residuals.  Values are  
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generally small, but apparently non-negligible, for all the models.
6 The largest part of the variance 
tends to correspond to the individual component, which indicates the need for an error-component 
model. Interestingly, although no overriding pattern emerges from Table 3 it seems that increasing the 
complexity of the model (i.e. moving from Model 1 to 4) reduces its variance components. This 
indicates  that  there  are  certain  efficiency  gains  that  are  associated  with  the  more  complex 
specifications. 
 
5. The size of firms 
A final element in the econometric specifications is the discrimination of firms by size. It is widely 
accepted that the size of the entrants is usually smaller than the average incumbent firm, that the 
hazard rate is inversely related to the size of the firm, and that the smaller the size the higher the 
business rotation see e.g. Fariñas et al. (1992) and Segarra (2002) for Spanish evidence. However, 
the size of firms has received little attention in empirical tests of the symmetry and simultaneity 
hypotheses. 
 
Given that differences in size reflect differences in other important variables such as investment, 
technology and age (Fariñas and Moreno, 2000, Audretsch and Elston, 2002), it is difficult to accept 
that a priori the determinants of entry and exit act in the same way in all the intervals of size. Rather, 
one would expect that the reactions of large firms to demand and technological factors differ from 
those of small and medium-sized concerns. The results of a simple statistical exercise proposed by 
Mata (1991: 54) suggest that this may well be the case. I calculated the correlation between the 
number of entrants for large (50 or more employees) and small (1 to 9 employees) firms, and did the 
same for the exits. The average coefficients over the 1994 to 2001 period were 0.44 for the entrants 
and 0.50 for the exits. I then calculated analogous average correlations for the rates of entry and exit 
                                                                        
6 Negative estimates of the variance components are not uncommon when dealing with SEM for panel data. 
Replacing them with zero would not affect the performance of the estimates (see Baltagi 1984), but in Model 4 
this was judged unnecessary because of the small (albeit negative) values obtained. Moreover, as shown in the  
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with respect to the total number of entries and exits and obtained values of -0.09 and -0.15. “This 
indicates that market size is probably a common determinant of both small- and large-scale entry, but 
also suggests that after market size is taken into account, these two types of entry [and exit] have 
different patterns and may be determined by different factors”. 
 
A  number  of  previous  related  studies  support  this  claim.  Focusing  on  small-firm  entry,  Acs  and 
Audrestch (1989b) review several factors (capital barriers, R&D, niches within the industry, product 
innovation strategies and flexible production techniques) that may explain why small entrants behave 
differently than large ones see also Acs and Audrestch (1989a). Mata (1991) discusses why the 
effects of entry barriers (capital requirements, scale economies, industrial concentration, sunk costs 
and product differentiation) ought to be different for large and small firms. Lieberman (1990) shows 
that the size of the incumbents is an important strategic liability that explains differences in the exit of 
declining industries. Small concerns are more likely to just close down (shakeout), whereas large 
firms tend to opt for incremental capacity reductions through the closure of plants (stakeout). 
 
All  these  findings  should  necessarily  condition  the  estimation  of  the  equations  of  entry and exit 
defined by Models 1 to 4. Consequently, results are presented separately for the whole sector (SIZE0, 
firms with more than 1 employee) and for different intervals of size defined by the DIRCE: firms with 
1 to 9 employees (SIZE1), firms with 10 to 19 employees (SIZE2), firms with 20 to 49 employees 
(SIZE3) and firms with 50 or more employees (SIZE4).
7 Acs and Audrestch (1989a) and Audretsch 
and Elston (2002), for example, use this kind of empirical strategy and analogous intervals to analyse, 
respectively,  the  entry  process  in  the  USA  and  liquidity  constraints  on  German  firms.  Acs  and 
Audrestch (1989b), Mata (1991) and Wagner (1994) did likewise, although they simply distinguished 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
appendix, estimation is actually based on the matrix TΣλ +Σε and its variance components are indeed positive in 
all the specifications. 
7 Self-employment appears to be guided by very different factors from those discussed in this paper see e.g. 
Evans  and  Leighton  (1989).  It  therefore  seemed  more  appropriate  to  drop  these  observations  from  all  our 
samples.  Previous  versions  of  this  paper  that  used  them  essentially  reported  the  same  results,  except  for  
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between large- and small-scale entry (measured in terms of employees in Acs and Audrestch 1989a 
and  Wagner  1994).  To  a  certain  extent,  the  breakdown  of  the  dependent  variable  resembles  the 
quantile regression approach of Mata and Machado (1996) for evaluating the determinants of firm 
start-up size. However, our ultimate goal is to show the impact of structural barriers and strategic 
actions across the size of the Spanish manufacturing firms.
8  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Estimation 
Table 4 shows the results under the symmetry hypothesis. If we focus on the statistically significant 
estimates for the whole sector (see columns SIZE0) we find that the signs are right, in the sense that 
they agree with the predictions in Table 2. According to these estimates of Model 1, industry growth 
and capital requirements are barriers to entry. Among the incentives is the minimum efficiency size. 
As for exits, price-cost margin and sunk costs act as barriers. As expected, ex-post benefits positively 
affect entry and ex-ante benefits negatively affect exits. However, we find no evidence of symmetry in 
the vector of explanatory variables. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows the results under the simultaneity hypothesis. Model 2 is “looking for an explanation of 
residual entry, over and above that which is determined by exit, and residual exit, exceeding that 
which is determined by entry” (Evans and Siegfried, 1992: 260). Here too the estimates for the whole 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
exceptionally large estimates of the replacement-displacement effects. This suggested a misspecification error 
that has been corrected in the current sample design.  
8 This analysis is valid as long as size is an exogenous covariate. This is unlikely to be the case at firm level but is 
more arguable at the sectorial level. In the appendix I show this using an illustrative example. The basic condition 
is the independence of the sectorial average size of the entries (or exits) with respect to the average unobserved 
heterogeneity of firms and sectors, where both averages are calculated over the number of incumbent firms. In 
general, similar concerns may arise regarding the exogeneity of other explanatory variables. However, the use of 
aggregate  data  implies  that  most  of  these variables are rough averages calculated over the incumbent firms 
(Garrett 2003), so it is reasonable to assume that they are uncorrelated with the sectorial error component of the  
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sector  (columns  SIZE0)  tend  to  be  as  expected.  These  support  the  existence  of  displacement-
replacement  effects  and  reveal  a  hint  of  symmetry  in  the  minimum  efficiency  size  and  R&D 
expenditure  unobserved  in  Model  1.  This  would  imply  that  symmetry  and  simultaneity  are 
complementary explanations of the relationship between entry and exit.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
As for the dynamic specifications of Model 3 (the first two columns in Table 6), the conclusions from 
Models 1 and 2 on the role of certain barriers (growth of industry, gross investment, price-cost margin 
and  sunk  costs)  and  the  non-significance  of  the  strategic  actions  of  rivals  are  not  substantially 
different. However, including lags of the dependent variables as regressors breaks the symmetry of 
barriers found in Model 2. This is also apparent in Model 4, in which we also find evidence to support 
the hypothesis of simultaneity and the existence of lagged (displacement) effects see column SIZE0 
in Table 7.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The statistical significance of the lagged endogenous variables in Models 3 and 4 suggests that their 
omission  in  Models  1  and  2  may  have  biased  our  initial  estimates.  In  particular,  the  lagged 
displacement effect is consistent with the evidence provided by Dunne et al. (1988) in the USA, 
Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991) in Belgium, Kleijweg and Lever (1996) in the Netherlands, 
and Lay (2003) in Taiwan. On the other hand, Carree and Thurik (1996) in the Netherlands did not 
find statistically significant estimates. Our finding of a lagged vacuum effect in Model 3 also agrees 
with Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991), Johnson and Parker (1994) in the UK, and Kleijweg and 
Lever (1996), whereas its non-significance in Model 4 was similarly reported by Carree and Thurik 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
entrant (exit). The downside, of course, is the potential bias that this may create with respect to any assessment of 
firm behaviour (Pakes 1983). However, this is not a major concern given the aim of the paper.  
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(1996) and Lay (2003). All in all, our results are largely consistent with previous related studies in 
other countries. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
If we now analyse the estimates from Model 1 by intervals of size, we notice that symmetry is not 
accepted  in  any  of  the  four  intervals  considered.  As  Table  4  shows,  this  hypothesis  is  therefore 
unambiguously rejected using this SUR specification. However, there are striking differences in the 
behaviour of small and large firms. On the one hand, the entry and exit of small firms is largely 
determined by some specific barriers (investment for the entry and sunk costs for the exit) and the 
expected benefits. On the other hand, large firms are affected by very few of the factors predicted by 
Economic Theory. In fact, as discussed below, the model fits very poorly for these firms.  
 
Acs  and  Audretsch (1989a, 1989b) and Mata (1991) report analogous differences in the US and 
Portuguese entry, respectively. As Table 5 shows, however, no such signs of misspecification for 
large firms arise when we include the endogenous variables among the covariates. In general, results 
from Model 2 are much more consistent across the intervals of size. This is mostly evident in the 
symmetry  of  certain  barriers  (although  the  variables  that  support  this  vary  across  intervals),  the 
existence of displacement-replacement effects, and the statistical significance of both ex-ante and ex-
post benefits. Nevertheless, firms with more than 50 employees present the largest estimates of the 
displacement-replacement and expected-benefits effects. Moreover, the evolution of ex-ante benefits 
does not appear to affect their exit from markets. What we need to determine now is whether this is 
evidence of dissimilar behaviour (as this paper argues) or the result of a specification error (as in 
Model 1). 
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Judging from the estimates obtained for Model 3, it is in fact evidence of dissimilar behaviour. As 
Table 6 shows, lagged displacement and replacement, as well as expected benefits, are statistically 
significant variables in all intervals of size considered except that of large firms (for which only 
displacement  and  ex-post  benefits  are  significant).  Moreover,  the  symmetry  hypothesis  is  not 
supported and the regularity in the determinants of entry and exit observed in Model 2 disappears. 
This  suggests  that  symmetry  and  simultaneity  are  rival  rather  than  complementary  hypotheses. 
However, Model 3 raises the same kind of reservations as Model 1 because the non-significance of 
traditional barriers in large firms is at odds with the predictions of the Economic Theory.   
 
To a large extent, Model 4 sorts out these caveats. First, Table 7 shows that there are differences in 
the determinants of entry and exit between large and small firms. These differences arise from the 
importance  for  large  firms  of  the  strategic  actions  of  rivals,  the  expected  benefits,  and  the 
displacement-replacement  effects  (both  lagged  and  simultaneous).  Second,  there  is  evidence  of  a 
conical revolving door phenomenon in the Spanish manufacturing industries see also Fariñas et al. 
(1992). This means that the interdependence between entries and exits is essentially a matter for large 
firms,  whereas  turbulence,  or  natural  churning,  seems  to  be  the  guiding  principle  for  small  and 
medium-sized  concerns  after  controlling  for  certain  barriers.  Audrestch  (1995:  165)  claims  that 
"[w]hether the revolving door or forest metaphor better applies to any given industry is apparently 
determined by the conditions of market demand and market technology". Our results suggest that one 
should  also  take  into  account  short-term  dynamics  and  the  size  of  firms.  Third,  as  Shapiro  and 
Khemani (1987) pointed out in the seminal paper of this literature, both symmetry and simultaneity 
are needed to explain the relationship between the rates of entry and exit in manufacturing industries. 
However, they cannot be applied uniformly across sizes for although they may be complementary 
explanations of the behaviour of large firms they appear more like rival hypotheses for small firms.  
 
6.2 Model evaluation  
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To conclude our empirical analysis it is interesting to discuss the results from the goodness-of-fit 
measures (in the bottom row of Tables 4 to 7). One caveat to bear in mind, however, is that those from 
the seemingly unrelated regressions (Buse, 1979) are not directly comparable with those from the 
systems of equations (Pesaran and Smith, 1994). Therefore, if we compare the values for Models 1 
and  3,  we  notice  that  the  simple  dynamic  model  of  Table  6  performs  better  than  the  symmetry 
specification  of  Table  4.  Moreover,  as  pointed  out  above,  under  the  symmetry  hypothesis  the 
explanatory power of the model is relatively high for the smaller firms (columns SIZE1 and SIZE2 in 
Table 4) but fairly poor for the large ones (columns SIZE3 and SIZE4 in Table 4). Model 3 shows 
more consistency across intervals of size but still performs worse for large firms see Table 6. 
Similarly, Model 2 (Table 5) performs worse and is less consistent across intervals of size than Model 
4 (Table 7). From this point of view, Models 3 and 4 should be taken as the standard specifications for 
making inference.  
 
However,  such  an  assessment  requires  further  statistical  support  because  these  goodness-of-fit 
measure should be interpreted with care. Given that Models 1, 2 and 3 are nested in Model 4, this 
simply boils down to analysing the t-tests of the current and lagged values of the dependent variables. 
The statistical significance of these variables suggests that, at least for these data, Model 4 is indeed 
the best specification. Accordingly, the estimates from this model are the basis for the comparisons 
with previous studies presented in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
One may still argue that the results for Model 4 (as well as those for Model 2) may be driven by the 
choice  of  instruments.  There  may  be  analogous  concerns  about  the  specification  of  the  model, 
particularly  with  regard  to  the  choice  of  explanatory  variables.  To  address  these  points  Table  8 
presents  estimates  of  the  lagged  and  simultaneous  replacement-displacement  effects  from:  i)  an  
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alternative  Three-Stage  LS  estimator  that  uses  a  different  matrix  of  instruments  and  the  original 
specifications; and ii) Error Components Two- and Three-Stage LS estimators on a simplified version 
of Models 2 and 4 see the appendix for details. As Baltagi and Li (1992) show, these Three-Stage 
estimators have the same asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. It is apparent from the figures in 
Table 8, however, that their small samples properties may differ. Also, Monte Carlo experiments 
indicate that the Error Components Two-Stage LS estimator is less affected by specification errors 
than its Three-Stage counterpart (Baltagi, 1984). However, the main conclusion of a dynamic conical 
interdependence between entry and exit remains largely unaltered across these alternative methods 
and specifications. Small differences do arise in the size of the effects, but given that some of the 
values look rather implausible (i.e. are outside the 0-1 interval) this actually reinforces our original 
choice. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The literature on the determinants of aggregate entry and exit has provided researchers and policy 
makers with a better understanding of the market’s selection process at the sectorial level. Symmetry 
and  simultaneity  have  become  reliable  analytical  frameworks  for  testing  a  number  of  research 
questions. In this context, our results for the Spanish manufacturing industries are consistent with 
those from previous studies for other countries. If we use suitable estimation techniques for panel data 
systems  of  equations  and  control  for  technological  and  demand  factors,  we  can  draw  two  main 
conclusions. Firstly, there is certain symmetry in the regressors of the entry and exit equations and a 
close relationship between entry and exit. Secondly, capital requirements (as a barrier) and ex-post 
benefits (as incentives) are the main determinants of entry, whereas sunk costs and ex-ante benefits 
are the main barriers to exit. At this stage of the economic knowledge on industry dynamics, however, 
it is interesting to pursue new avenues of research. In this paper I have argued that among the most 
obvious gaps in this literature are the omission of the size of firms and the absence of a dynamic 
setting. 
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Goodness-of-fit  measures  and  nested  model  selection  tests  suggest  that  we  need  a  complex 
econometric specification to analyse entry and exit properly. Symmetry, simultaneity and dynamics, 
as well as size discrimination and error terms correlations, are probably needed. A more restricted 
framework may provide misleading results. In particular, the break up by intervals of size shows that 
symmetry and simultaneity may be rival (complementary) explanations for small and medium-sized 
(large) firms. There is also evidence of a conical revolving door driving the entry and exit processes, 
i.e. a high turbulence among the small firms and a partially adjusted displacement-replacement among 
the large ones. These results support our tenets and cast doubts on the robustness of the conclusions of 
static, size-homogeneous tests.  
 
These conclusions, however, are subject to two important constraints: the characteristics of the data 
set  and  the  econometric  techniques.  As  I  have  used  aggregated  data,  inference  actually  refers to 
(conditional) average sectorial effects and does not necessarily hold at firm level. In fact, in models 
using individual data the correlations between some regressors and the unobservable firm effects may 
alter the estimates considerably. Also, the dynamic relationships may be affected by the short period 
of time considered. If a longer time series had been available, I could also have explored Granger-
causality and the existence of unitary roots. Future research should take care of these aspects.  
 
8. Appendix 
8.1 Estimation methods 
Let us consider the following system of M (=2, entry and exit) equations: 
 
          ym = Xmβm+ um     (m = 1,...,M)    (1) , 
 
in which ym is a NT vector, Xm is a (NT)x(km + 1) matrix containing the explanatory variables and βm is 
a (km + 1) vector of coefficients. The error component term is: 
 
          um= Zλµm+εm             (2), 
 
where Zλ = IN ⊗ ιT, IN is an identity matrix of dimension N (= 20) and ιT is a vector of ones of 
dimension T (= 8). Moreover, λm’ = (λ1m,λ2m,...,λnm) is a vector of random latent variables and ε’ = 
(ε11m,..., ε1Tm,..., εN1m,..., εNTm) is an idiosyncratic shock with the classical features. We assume that  
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these are independent vectors with zero expectation and matrix of variances and covariances given by 
Σλ = [
2
ms λ σ ] and Σε = [
2
ms ε σ ], s = 1,...,M. This error-components structure enables us to control for 
the unobservable heterogeneity of the sectors. 
 
Under the symmetry hypothesis, the starting point for the estimation is an SUR analogous to the 
cross-section case. The main difference is the presence of new components in the variance across 
equations. So, the matrix of variances and covariances of the system, Ω = [Ωml], is: 
 
        E (uu’) = Σλ ⊗ (IN ⊗ JT) + Σε ⊗ INT        (3),  
 
where JT is a matrix of ones of dimension T and INT is an identity matrix of dimension NT. Given that 
for any scalar r it can be demonstrated that Ω 
r = (TΣλ +Σε )⊗ P + Σ ε
r ⊗ Q P = IN ⊗ (JT / T) and Q = 
INT – P, the vector of coefficients is obtained as a Generalised Least Squares estimator: 
 
          β = (X’Ω 
-1X)
-1X’Ω 
-1y          (4). 
 
In particular, in Model 1 the feasible forms are based on the errors of a Least Squares estimation 
(Avery, 1977). Results are shown in Table 4. This method is also used to estimate Model 3, in which 
a  predetermined  variable  (the  lagged  dependent  of  the  other  equation)  is  included  among  the 
explanatory variables. Results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Under the hypothesis of simultaneity (Models 2 and 4), the specification is similar to that of (1), (2), 
and (3). The main difference is the endogenous variables on the right hand side of the model. Let us 
consider the system in (1), but rewrite it in compact form: 
 
          y = Zδ + u            (5). 
 
with  ( ) ' y ,..., ' y , ' y ' y M 2 1 = , Z = diag [Zm] = diag [ym, Xm],  ( ) ' , ' ' m m m β γ δ =  and  ( ) ' u ,..., ' u , ' u ' u M 2 1 = . If we 
premultiply  (5)  by  Ω 
-1/2  (y
*  =  Ω 
-1/2y,  Z
*  =  Ω 
-1/2Z  and  u
*  =  Ω 
-1/2u)  and  define  the  matrix  of 
instruments W, the vector of estimated coefficients can be obtained from the following expression: 
 
          δ = (Z
*’PwZ
*)
-1Z
*’Pwy
*           (6), 
 
where PW =W(W’W)
-1W’ is the projection matrix onto W. I use errors from a Two-Stage Least Squares 
estimation to obtain feasible forms (Baltagi, 1984). As for the matrix of instruments, let X
E be a NTxk 
matrix  containing  all  the  exogenous  variables  in  the  system.  Then  Ω 
-1/2(IM  ⊗  X
E)  provides  the 
(efficient) Three-Stage Least Squares estimator (Baltagi and Li, 1992), whereas [QX
E, PX
E] and [IM ⊗ 
QX
E, IM ⊗ PX
E] provide, respectively, the Error Components Two- and Three-Stage Least Squares 
Estimator (Baltagi, 1981).
9 Results in Tables 5 and 7 correspond to the Error Components Three-
Stage Least Squares Estimator of Models 2 and 4, respectively. Table 8 presents selected comparative 
results  from  the  other  estimates.  In  Model  4  the  lagged  endogenous  variables  are  considered 
predetermined and are not instrumentalised.  
                                                                        
9 Error Components Two- and Three-Stage estimators require that X
E contains neither individual- nor time-
invariant  variables,  otherwise  PW  does  not  have  full  rank.  This  is  because  of  the  individual  averages  and 
deviations from individual means (i.e. constants and zeros) created by the transformation matrices P and Q. To 
avoid  this  trap  the  matrix  of  instruments  in  the  Error  Components  Three-Stage  Least  Squares  Estimator  is 
actually W = [IM ⊗ Q X
E
it ,IM ⊗ P X
E
it ,Ω 
-1/2(IM ⊗  X
E
i ),Ω 
-1/2(IM ⊗  X
E
t )] , where X
E= [ X
E
it , X
E
i , X
E
t ]. This 
problem does not arise in the Two-Stage estimators because this was obtained for a simplified version of Models 
2 and 4 without such individual- and time-invariant variables, i.e. we drop the variables MSi, PDi, GDPPt and 
GDPAt.  As  explained  in  section  6.2,  this  was  done  to  address  the  robustness  of  the  results  to  alternative 
specifications.  
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8.2 Exogeneity of firm size in a model of aggregate entry and exit 
The following example illustrates under which conditions size is not endogenously determined at the 
sectorial level. Our approach is analogous to that of Pakes (1983) and Garrett (2003) in the context of 
aggregation problems. However, here we are not concerned with how to recover micro-responses 
from aggregated regressions or what the repercussions of aggregation on statistical inference are. 
Rather, our interest is precisely the aggregated model.  
 
Let us first consider a disaggregated version of our models see section 4 for a complete description. 
At the firm level, the unobservable dependent variable (y*, e.g. expected benefits) takes value y = 1 if 
firm i enters (exits) sector j in period t (i.e. y* > 0), and y = 0 otherwise. The vector of explanatory 
variables includes size (denoted by x) as the main covariate and a set of control variables (denoted by 
z):  
 
        y*ijt = β0 + β1xijt + β2zijt + µi + λj + ηt + εijt      (7), 
 
where β0, β1 and β2 are conformable parameters. This latent variable model also includes an error 
component with firm (µi), sector (λj) and time (ηt) effects and a classical disturbance (εijt). As for the 
moment  conditions,  consistent  with  the  work  of  Lucas  (1978),  Evans  and  Jovanovic  (1989)  and 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) we assume that Cov(xijt,λj) = 0 and Cov(xijt,µi) ≠ 0. This means that entry 
(exit)  and  size  are  outcomes  of  an  optimal  decision  process  in  which  the  firm  chooses  both 
simultaneously  on  the  basis  of  the  observed  attributes  of  the  industry  (and  not  of  unobservable 
characteristics such as the quality of the labour force or the incumbents' technology). Conditional on 
entry, size essentially depends on e.g. financial and technological constraints and, conditional on exit, 
on e.g. size in the previous period and business prospects.
10 Moreover, firm size is correlated with 
unobserved firm characteristics such as entrepreneurial talent, goodwill and managerial ability.  
 
Our  present  concern,  however,  is  not  the  firm-level  model  of  (7)  but  the  following  aggregated 
regression equation: 
 
        y.jt = β0. + β1.x.jt + β2.z.jt + µi. + λj. + ηt. + ε.jt      (8), 
 
where the dots denote averages over the number of incumbent firms in sector j, Nj. In compact form, 
Yjt = Xjtβ + λj + εjt. The critical assumption for the analysis developed in sections 5 and 6 is that 
Cov(x.jt,µi.) = 0 = Cov(x.jt,λj.). If we assume that the error components are random variables with zero 
means  and  constant  variances  (see  the  previous  appendix  on  estimation  methods),  then  both 
covariances tend to zero because the number of incumbent firms in each sector is fairly large. More 
specifically, Cov(x.jt,µi.) = E(x.jtµi.) = (Nj)
-2E(
i
Σxijt
i
Σλj) = 0, and similarly for Cov(x.jt,λj.).  
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Table 1: Correlation between GRE and GRX in Spanish manufacturing (1994-2001)
 
 
Code  Description (SIC, CNAE)   
15  Food products and beverages  0.46 
16  Tobacco products  – – – 
17  Textiles  0.26 
18  Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  -
0.11 
19  Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness 
and footwear 
0.17 
20  Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
0.82 
21  Paper and paper products  0.31 
22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  0.42 
23  Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel  – – – 
24  Chemicals and chemical products  0.57 
25  Rubber and plastic products  0.51 
26  Other non-metallic mineral products  0.63 
27  Basic metals  0.24 
28  Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  0.88 
29  Machinery and equipment  0.44 
30  Office, accounting and computing machinery  0.06 
31  Electrical machinery and apparatus   0.57 
32  Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus  0.36 
33  Medical, precision, and optical instruments, watches and clocks  0.12 
34  Motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers  0.52 
35  Transport equipment  0.17 
36  Furniture  0.67 
15-36  Manufacturing (excluding codes 16 and 23)  0.63 
 
Note: The gross rate of entry is GREit = Nº of Entry Firmsit / Nº of Active Firmsit and the gross rate of exit is GRXit = 
Nº of Exiting Firmsit  / Nº of Active Firmsit. Calculations are based on data from the DIRCE and only include firms 
with more than one employee (see footnote 7 in the text). The sub-index i = 1, ..., 20 and t= 1994, ..., 2001 denote, 
respectively, the SIC (CNAE) codes and the time period. I did not include tobacco and petroleum in the sample 
because of the shortage of firms. 
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Table 3: Estimated Variances and Covariances of the Error Term
 
 
  SIZE0  SIZE1  SIZE2  SIZE3  SIZE4 
  Σλ  Σε  Σλ  Σε  Σλ  Σε  Σλ  Σε  Σλ  Σε 
Model 1 
2
entry σ  
2
exit σ  
σ exit entry  
 
0.0318 
0.0216 
0.0204 
0.0323 
0.0417 
0.0093 
 
0.0221 
0.0169 
0.0110 
 
0.0316 
0.0407 
0.0093 
 
0.0683 
0.0709 
0.0683 
 
0.0671 
0.1781 
0.0347 
 
0.1554 
0.0970 
0.1330 
 
0.1166 
0.2143 
0.0143 
 
0.1025 
0.0515 
0.063 
 
0.2085 
0.2294 
0.0438 
Model 2 
2
entry σ  
2
exit σ  
σ exit entry  
 
0.0317 
0.0175 
0.0188 
 
0.0325 
0.0428 
0.0102 
 
0.0213 
0.0148 
0.0102 
 
0.0324 
0.0416 
0.0090 
 
0.0681 
0.0675 
0.0690 
 
0.0672 
0.1761 
0.0346 
 
0.1550 
0.0978 
0.1341 
 
0.1149 
0.2127 
0.0173 
 
0.0657 
0.0369 
0.0485 
 
0.2174 
0.2341 
0.0488 
Model 3 
2
entry σ  
2
exit σ  
σ exit entry  
 
0.0188 
0.0080 
-0.0018 
 
0.0307 
0.0312 
0.0029 
 
0.0169 
0.0118 
-0.0012 
 
0.0287 
0.0311 
0.0029 
 
0.0251 
0.0046 
0.0052 
 
0.0853 
0.1578 
0.0328 
 
0.0294 
0.0078 
0.0169 
 
0.1608 
0.1701 
-0.0089 
 
0.0682 
0.0091 
0.0065 
 
0.2239 
0.2275 
0.0670 
Model 4 
2
entry σ  
2
exit σ  
σ exit entry  
 
0.0103 
0.0054 
-0.0034 
 
0.0285 
0.0295 
-0.0003 
 
0.0095 
0.0081 
0.0009 
 
0.0313 
0.0327 
0.0047 
 
-0.0040 
0.0125 
0.0048 
 
0.0823 
0.1586 
0.0302 
 
-0.0014 
0.0063 
0.0132 
 
0.1610 
0.1680 
-0.0073 
 
0.0180 
-0.0005 
0.0068 
 
0.2422 
0.2332 
0.0639 
 
Note: SIZE0 = Firms with more than 1 employee. SIZE1= Firms with 1 to 9 employees. SIZE2 = Firms with 10 
to 19 employees. SIZE3= Firms with 20 to 49 employees. SIZE4 = Firms with more than 50 employees. Σλ and 
Σε denote, respectively, the matrices of variances ( 2
entry σ , 2
exit σ ) and covariances (σ exit entry ) of the sectorial 
and idiosyncratic components of the error term.  
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